The Speaker, the Executive and the Politics Behind Malawi’s 12 Inquiries

By Jack McAdams

To begin with, Speaker of Parliament Sameer Suleman deserves credit for demonstrating the courage to confront alleged corruption and governance failures in public institutions. Accountability is a noble pursuit, and it is particularly exciting to understand that during a private caucus between the Speaker and the President at the State House, the President commended the Speaker for “positioning up in the fight against corruption” (quoting the President’s exact words).

However, the nobility of an objective does not automatically validate the legality of the means employed to achieve it. The announcement of 12 parliamentary inquiries raises a fundamental constitutional question of whether the Speaker properly exercised powers that are otherwise vested in Parliament. Preliminary verdict indicates that he was, largely, attempting to exercise institutional authority unilaterally. That, in itself, is not a proper exercise of the powers vested.

The Executive’s objection, through the Government’s Spokesperson, Mr. Shadrick Namalomba, is therefore not necessarily an attack on accountability. To the contrary, it is, instead, a defence of constitutional order. Indeed, the Government has questioned whether the Speaker could establish such committees without the requisite parliamentary authority, violating Standing Orders, thereby invoking section 56(1) of the Constitution.

Politically, however, the circumstances invite a more uncomfortable observation. Suleman is not an opposition figure confronting a hostile administration; he belongs to the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and holds the senior position of National Organising Secretary on its National Executive Committee. Government Spokesperson Shadrick Namalomba’s insistence that the Speaker should coordinate his approach with the Executive and the party’s leadership, therefore, is coming from a genuine place of concern.

A Speaker must exercise his constitutional responsibilities independently, but independence should never become a convenient justification for disregarding institutional procedure or creating avoidable confrontation within the government he belongs to. Otherwise, how would one dispute the rumours that all he is doing is to position himself as potential successor to President Mutharika in the party’s leadership, thereby abusing his national leadership role to perpetuate self-interest via intra-party politics?

One can really doubt any claim that Suleman’s posturing is an uncompromising crusade for accountability. His approach and hostility that constantly begs public notice appears more of a struggle for political relevance, trying to show that he is positioned at a fulcrum that ably controls the levers of power.

It would be premature to conclude that Suleman was excluded from some alleged “feast” of political patronage without evidence. Nevertheless, the timing and intensity of his confrontation make it reasonable to demand a transparent explanation of the institutional and political considerations behind his approach.

There is a High Court injunction restraining the proposed inquiries pending further proceedings, with the inter partes hearing scheduled for 5 November 2026. The injunction does not establish that Suleman acted unlawfully; that question remains for judicial determination. Nevertheless, it underscores a constitutional principle that public officeholders cannot simply proceed as though their interpretation of their powers were conclusive.

The Speaker’s determination to pursue investigations must be measured against the Constitution, applicable parliamentary procedures and the limits of his own office. If the Constitution vests a particular decision in Parliament collectively, the Speaker cannot assume that the powers of the institution automatically belong to him personally. Parliamentary oversight is indispensable, but so is constitutional restraint. The Speaker should therefore demonstrate that his actions rest on a defensible legal foundation rather than relying on the popular appeal of an anti-corruption campaign to settle a question of constitutional authority.

Section 98(1) of the Constitution designates the Attorney General as the Government’s principal legal adviser, while he is responsible for advising Government on legal matters and conducting civil litigation on its behalf. Mbeta has explained that he assumed responsibility for the representation of Parliament and the Speaker after reviewing the case and raising concerns about the process through which private counsel had initially been appointed. His intervention therefore has a credible institutional rationale. Where litigation raises questions about the constitutional boundaries between state institutions, the Government’s principal legal adviser has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the relevant legal issues are properly addressed.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Malawi needs accountability; it unquestionably does. The question is whether accountability will be pursued through constitutionally authorised institutions, lawful procedures and respect for the separation of powers. Namalomba is right to insist that public institutions cannot operate as isolated political fiefdoms, while Mbeta is entitled to ensure that constitutional questions receive proper legal attention. The Speaker cannot invoke oversight as a blanket justification for every procedural or institutional decision he makes.

Can he establish the legality of his actions without turning parliamentary oversight into a personal political campaign? If his intentions are genuinely about fighting corruption, he should welcome legal clarity and demonstrate that his proposed inquiries are grounded in adherence to procedural law. In constitutional democracy, courage is admirable  but courage without legal discipline can become overreach, and political independence without institutional accountability can become self-interest.